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This dissertation constitutes a part of the LLM in Transnational and European Commercial 
Law, Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation at the International Hellenic University (I.H.U.).  
 
This dissertation focuses on the part of Mediation and specifically in the recent United Nations 
Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (the 
Singapore Convention) which was entered into force on Mediation on 12 September 2020.  
 
It will be demonstrated that the Singapore Convention aims to have a great impact on 
international trade since it is the first legal instrument which enforces cross-border mediated 
settlement agreements. Specifically, it will provide the reader with a general knowledge and 
understanding of the Singapore Convention. Additionally, the key Article 5: refusal to grant 
relief will be analysed extensively. It will be demonstrated that the effectiveness of the 
Singapore Convention relies in a large extent to the application of Article 5. The courts may 
refuse to grant relief in certain circumstances and thus, it is significant to analyse them in 
order to examine whether the grounds can be applied accordingly. The signatory states and 
any potential ones in the future need to be aware as to why a refusal to grant relief under the 
specific Convention may occur. As a result, the dissertation will be divided into two parts. The 
first will mention briefly some key elements of the Singapore Convention and the second part 
will examine Article 5. Some of the aspects will be seen in relation to the New York Convention 
1958. The entry into force in less than a year makes it a rather topical issue which needs to 









The thesis of the dissertation “Reflections on the Singapore Convention” is an extensive 
analysis of the recent Singapore Convention which was mentioned and studied briefly during 
the LLM in Transnational and European Commercial Law, Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation 
at the International Hellenic University (I.H.U.).  
 
It would be impossible to undertake such a topic without the assistance of Prof. Komninos G. 
Komnios. His support during the dissertation was remarkable while his replies to certain 
issues I faced were not only extremely instant, but also rather productive. His guidance was 
present through the whole studying of the issue and thus I was able to discover the key 
elements which needed to be addressed.   
Apart from my deepest thanks to Prof. Komninos G. Komnios, I must mention my gratitude to 
my sister and colleague lawyer, Ligeia Zachariadi – Mylopoulou who assisted in some crucial 
moments of the dissertation. She has the necessary experience to struggle through dead 
ends, acquiring a lot of creditability from many prominent academics, including my Professor 
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Alternative dispute resolution (‘ADR’) has been rapidly evolving the last years in international 
trade. Arbitration has been the prevailing ADR method adopted by contracting parties since 
one of the main advantages it entails is enforceability of the arbitration agreement. 
Confidence and security are two elements crucial to every relationship, especially in trading 
ones. Mediation, therefore, was lacking in popularity and was perceived as a last resort ADR 
method, since the advantage incorporated in arbitration was absent in mediation. However, 
one groundbreaking development is about to change the landscape and balance arbitration 
and mediation, as two equally effective and secure ADR methods. This development refers to 
the signing of the recent United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements 
Resulting from Mediation (Singapore Convention on Mediation)1, which demonstrates the 
will of many countries to resolve disputes outside the courts in a more effective, less costly 
and timely manner. International commercial disputes which are classified as high-value 
cases, such as construction projects, have been increasing and accordingly the last years it 
has been supported that mediation should expand in more areas of international business2. 
As a result, the Singapore Convention on Mediation aims to increase the credibility and status 
of mediation as an effective way of reaching an agreement in any conflict between 
commercial parties. The Convention is open for signature by all States in Singapore, since 7 
August 2019, and until today there are 53 signatories and 6 parties3.  The novel feature of this 
Convention is the element of enforceability of mediation as an alternative dispute resolution. 
As the Preamble of the Singapore Convention states: 
“Convinced that the establishment of a framework for international settlement agreements 
resulting from mediation that is acceptable to States with different legal, social and economic 
systems would contribute to the development of harmonious international economic 
relations”4 
The dissertation aims to provide reflections on the Singapore Convention. In doing so, it will 
demonstrate how the Singapore Convention can encourage cross-border commercial 
                                                          
1 United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (the Singapore 
Convention) 
2 Mediation of Investor – State Conflicts, Harvard Law Review, 2014, p. 2551 
3 United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties, Chapter XXII Commercial Arbitration and Mediation 
4 Ibid 1, p. 3 
disputes due its enforceability and how it can facilitate international trade, while it will also 
present certain concerns deriving from incorporated –necessary yet troubling- provisions. The 
first chapter serves the purpose of illustrating to the reader the idea, which led to the signing 
of the Singapore Convention. Understanding the background and the objective of the 
Singapore Convention is essential before dwelling into the presentation and examination of 
the material of certain by Articles of the Convention. The first chapter consists of five small 
sections. Initially, some statistics will be presented in order to emphasise the popularity of 
the mediation and how the States aim to prefer the specific process as an alternative dispute 
resolution. The second section introduces the background of the Singapore Convention, while 
the remaining three analyse summarily three crucial components of mediation, the definition 
of mediation, the scope of application and the seat of mediation. Concluding the first chapter, 
the reader will be equipped with the necessary information in order to delve into more 
perplex and essential matters.  
The Singapore Convention renders any settlement agreement enforceable, a critical 
component that was long due and which will contribute in increasing confidence to parties 
that choose mediation as an ADR.  Subsequently, great focus will be placed on Article 5 of the 
Convention, which provides the grounds for refusing to grant relief and its occasions. The 
underlying reason is that Article 5 states various reasons for a party to reject an enforcement 
of an international mediated settlement agreement (IMSA).  From the outset, Article 5 seems 
as an obstacle in promoting international settlement agreements resulting from mediation, 
however, considering that the Convention is rather recent, is yet to be seen in practice, 
whether Article 5 poses an impediment or not.  For instance, United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law confirmed with relevant facts that mediation can be enforced 
limitedly internationally in contrast with domestic enforcement5, a reality that, with the 
Singapore Convention can be cast away to the past. For a more comprehensive understanding 
of the essence of this novel feature of enforceability that the Singapore Convention 
introduces for the first time in mediation history, chapter two will proceed with a comparative 
analysis of the evolution of mediation and arbitration with a special focus on the Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards [New York Convention, 
(‘NYC’)]. Since every coin has two sides, the last chapter of the dissertation will dwell on 
                                                          
5 Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), 62nd Session, New York, 2-6 February 2015, pp 7-8  
Article 5 of the Singapore Convention, examining whether it presents a serious threat in 
promoting international mediation or it was unavoidable to include it in order to retain the 
balance. It will be illustrated which approach to this provision will be followed by the court so 
as to enhance IMSAs. The fact that Singapore Convention was signed recently, makes this area 
a topical area of investigation. Nevertheless, it seems that its ratification is more than topical 
since due to the worldwide circumstances of the pandemic. For instance, only a few months 
ago Singapore International Mediation Centre (‘SIMC’) and Japan International Mediation 
Center (‘JIMC’) drafted the JIMC-SIMC Joint Covid-19 Protocol which is the first protocol for 
joint online mediation during today’s extraordinary conditions. Accordingly, Article 4 (4) of 
the Protocol states that “The Parties may seek enforcement in countries that have approved 
or ratified the Singapore Convention on Mediation”6. Concluding this dissertation, an 
overview of the key terms and points that would attract more parties to sign are presented, 
and the reflections drawn from this analysis of the Singapore Convention that has preceded.  
Mediation as an Alternative Dispute Resolution Mode 
Before dwelling into the essence of Singapore Convention, it is important to underscore some 
features on the dispute settlement mode of mediation. The initial idea was to implement into 
a two -or more- person contracting relationship that is in conflict, a third party that would 
serve as a neutral assistant and help them resolve the controversy. 7 It was acknowledged as 
a more informal approach of resolving the dispute between the parties8 . However, from an 
informal mechanism, mediation evolved and reached the status of a regularly used method 
in resolving disputes, not only domestically but internationally as well. As a result, today it has 
been accepted that mediation is an alternative dispute resolution method with a structured 
multi-staged process in which an impartial third party facilitates communication to help 
parties reach to a voluntary mutual agreement.9 Apart from the ultimate target of a voluntary 
mutual agreement, mediation is also appealing due to its confidential nature. Additionally, 
the aim is to resolve a dispute between parties not only faster than going into court 
proceedings, but also in a less costly manner for each party. Το sum up so far, it can be 
                                                          
6 JIMC-SIMC Joint Covid-19 Protocol, Article 4 (4) 
7 Laurance M. Hude Jr., ‘Mediation’, 1984, Juvenille and Family Court Journal 35(1), p. 57  
8 Mediation, Digest of International Law, 1971, p. 960 
9 Sgubini A., Prieditis M. & Marighetto A., ‘Arbitration, Mediation and Conciliation: differences and similarities 
from an International and Italian business perspective’, 2004, Bridge Mediation LLC 
deducted that mediation presents overall many advantages as a dispute settlement mode in 
relation to court proceedings. Despite its attractive nature, mediation was lacking compared 
to arbitration. Evidently, as it will be illustrated, the Singapore Convention is a fundamental 
prerequisite for the successful process of mediation, especially in private international law. 
Recent Statistics 
 
The growing popularity of mediation and its lacking compared to arbitration can be 
demonstrated from recent evidence. For instance in 2018 the number of mediation new 
filings reached 37 in the International Centre for ADR, while the number of arbitration filings 
was as high as 842; in 2019, the arbitration continued to lead the way since the number of 
new filings was 869 and for mediation was 32.10 However, the resolution of construction and 
engineering disputes being more frequent, proves that mediation is also appropriate for high-
value disputes, since the range of the value of disputes varied from 326.000 thousand dollars 
to 216 million dollars. 11 
Such steady yet growing emergence of mediation in addition with the aim of Singapore 
Convention to promote even further the use of such mechanism, could bring great results in 
the near future. The question remains to be seen, especially if it will bring the same result 
with the 1958 New York Convention. The signatories of the New York Convention at this 
moment are 166 out of the 195 countries worldwide.12 The great participation leads to the 
result that international commercial arbitration is most welcome by many countries in order 
to settle leaving court proceedings apart. It is a common understanding between the 
signatories that arbitration proceedings save a lot of time and when the party is not a 
signatory of New York Convention then it would be most likely that it would be problematic 
to settle and recognise arbitral awards.13 Many years preceded in order for New York 
Convention to achieve such status and acknowledgment because apart from signing a 
convention, it is important for domestic judicial system to adjust to the new regime. The 
combination of low cost domestic judicial policies and their improvement so as to connect 
                                                          
10 ICC Dispute Resolution Statistics (2018), p 8, 17 and ICC Dispute Resolution Statistics (2019) p.19 
11 Ibid 10 
12 United Nations Commission on International law, Status: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958) 
13 Lagerberg G. & Professor Mistellis L., ‘International Arbitration: Corporate attitudes and practices’, 2008, 
American Review of International Arbitration 19(3-4) p. 10 
with arbitration has increased emphatically foreign direct investments.14 Accordingly, the 
purpose of the Singapore Convention is to achieve the status of the New York Convention and 
the same quality and condition so as mediation will be a significant dispute resolution tool in 
cross-border cases.15 It will be seen how the Singapore Convention is drafted in order to 
provide respective enforcement of international commercial settlement agreements 
resulting from mediation (‘IMSAs’) with the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. 
Background of the Singapore Convention 
 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law  (‘UNCITRAL’) was established back in 
1966 and focuses on the progressive harmonisation and unification of international trade 
law.16 Its role has been and still is of great significance since it performs great effort to balance 
and coordinate international law bearing in mind the difficulties and peculiarities of national 
laws. The bodies of UNCITRAL, which facilitate continuous results to achieve this task 
practically, are the Working Groups. There are six Working Groups specified in different 
sectors. In present, Working Group II is concerned on international commercial law in relation 
to arbitration, conciliation and dispute settlement. Specifically, the Singapore Convention is a 
result which was studied extensively during September 201517 and February 201818, adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly on 20 December 201819 and finally entered into force 
on 12 September 2020. Issues which led to this specific result were addressed during the 
previous decade from time to time, alarming the sector of international business and the 
relevant legal communities. In 2014, during a survey that focused, among others, on the 
future of international commercial mediation and conciliation 75% of the participants 
(individuals from e.g. private practice, neutrals, academics etc) agreed that an international 
treaty as a legal instrument for the enforcement of mediation agreements and recognition 
                                                          
14 Myburgh A. & Paniagua J., Does International Commercial Arbitration Promote Foreign Direct Investment? 
2016, The Journal of Law and Economics 59(3) pp. 597-627. 
15 Alexander N. & Shouyu C., ‘An Introduction to the Singapore Convention on Mediation – Perspectives from 
Singapore’, 2018 Nederlands-Vlaams tijdschrift voor mediation en conflictmanagement 4, p. 42 
16 UN - General Assembly resolution 2205 (XXI) of 17 December 1966 Establishing - United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law - United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
17Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its sixty-third session (Vienna, 7-11 
September 2015), p. 2 
18 Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its sixty-third session (New York, 5-9 
February 2018), p. 3 
19 General Assembly resolution 73/198 of 20 December 2018 
and enforcement of IMSAs will enhance international trade law.20 The Working Group II had 
an extensive analysis to reach to the outcome of what constitutes a “settlement agreement” 
on this context. The debate was raised between the settlement disputes modes of mediation 
and conciliation. It was finally agreed that “[..]an agreement resulting from mediation and 
concluded in writing by the parties to resolve a commercial dispute (“settlement agreement”) 
[..]21” is the most functional phrasing since it was decided that “settlement agreement” can 
arise from other forms of settlement dispute modes such as conciliation.22 Indeed, mediation 
and conciliation are rather similar procedures and they are entirely different in the context of 
the role and character of the independent third party. The difference is not substantive from 
the perspective that does not affect the implications of settlement agreements. However, it 
was recognised that the term “mediation” would promote the adoption and function of the 
Model Law. Accordingly, the Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation 2002 was 
amended by the Working Group II in UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Mediation and International Settlement Agreements Results from Mediation in 2018 and was 
adopted by the General Assembly23. Evidently, the Model Law of 2018 gave substantial 
guidance to the final enactment of the Singapore Convention, as some of the Articles of Model 
Law remained unchanged in the Singapore Convention.  
Despite the majority of the result of the above survey the challenging issue which is raised is 
to overcome this discrepancies of domestic law of each State. For instance, in France it has 
been considered that mediation agreements are generally enforceable and parties need to 
proceed initially with mediation process and then proceed to the courts24. In Germany, there 
has been a lot of academic debate in relation to the legal nature of mediation clauses and 
German Courts have stated that when mediation clauses exist, litigation is matter of the last 
resort25. In other jurisdictions, such as UK26, Hong Kong27 and Singapore28, it was stated that 
                                                          
20 Strong S., ‘Use and Perception of International Commercial Mediation and Conciliation: A Preliminary Report 
on Issues Relating to the Proposed UNCITRAL Convention on International Commercial Mediation and 
Conciliation’, 2014, University of Missouri School of Legal Studies R.P. 28, p. 51 
21 Ibid 1 Article 1  
22 Ibid 17 p. 5 
23 General Assembly resolution 57/18 
24 Alexander N., International and Comparative Mediation – Legal Perspectives, 2009 pp. 174-175 
25 Ibid 9 p. 180 
26 Wah (aka Alan Tang) v Grant Thornton International Ltd (2012) WEHC 3198 at 59-60 
27 Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co Ltd v Vigour Ltd (2005) HKEC 258 at 29 
28 International Research Corp plc v Lufthansa Systems Asia Pacific Pte Ltd (2014) 1 SLR 130 at 54 
a mediation clause is taken into account only if it is precise enough and clarified thoroughly. 
This inconsistency of approaching mediation clauses between jurisdiction was considered 
extremely carefully by the Working Group II in order to trigger the necessary eagerness for 
the Singapore Convention to develop into international trade.  
Definition of mediation within the Singapore Convention – a critical outline 
 
The promotion of mediation through the Singapore Convention can be already found in the 
definition of mediation itself. According to the Definitions in Article 2 (3) “Mediation” means 
“a process, irrespective of the expression used or the basis upon which the process is carried 
out, whereby parties attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute with the 
assistance of a third person or persons (“the mediator”) lacking the authority to impose a 
solution upon the parties to the dispute.”29 From the first reading it can be pointed out that 
the definition provided is rather general and broad. For instance, on a report of the Working 
Group II, they decided not to include the phrase “structured process” and put only the word 
“process” on the definition.30 The Working Group II widely discussed this issue in the context 
of the conciliation process and they agreed that requiring a structured process might cause 
exclusion of many dispute settlement modes which had been conducted informally or were 
mere negotiations.31 As many legal instruments, where there is great rigidity, it exists at the 
expense of flexibility. Since the Singapore Convention is a rather recent legal instrument and 
aims for its unification in the level of international trade, it is rather logical to prefer flexibility. 
Whether there will be consideration for alteration, will be seen in its practice in the near 
future. The aim is not to discourage the parties as to whether the dispute settlement mode 
they have agreed is a structured process or not and thus produce conflict on the 
interpretation of Article 2 (3). Besides, mediation is rather flexible in its own nature, which 
allows the mediator to adjust to any circumstances which might arise during the process, so 
as the target of a mutual agreement between the parties will be always be a realistic 
perspective. As with the Singapore Convention, it is generally recognised that if not all, many 
private international law conventions avoid to provide specific definitions because it might 
                                                          
29 Ibid 1 Article 2 (3) 
30 Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its sixty-fifth session (Vienna, 12-23 
September 2016), pp. 8-9 
31 Ibid 30, p. 8 
cause the risk of their limited application32. On the contrary, the Singapore Convention due 
to the broad functional mediation it can be acknowledged that not only facilitative and 
evaluative mediation is covered but also other dispute settlement modes such as neutral 
evaluation and mini-trial.33 Moreover, it has been seen that the last years technology evolves 
rapidly and as a result, it will be inevitable not to discuss extensively whether Article 2 (3) can 
extended to artificial intelligence. This raises the issue not only in the procedural content e.g. 
if algorithms may fall under the “process” stated in Article 2 (3) but also to the issue of the 
“mediator”. The latter is a wide debate in relation to granting legal personality to artificial 
intelligence i.e. recognised as a subject of law.34 
Scope of the Application 
 
Article 1 of the Singapore Convention clarifies the scope of application of the Convention and 
states that a settlement agreement must be mediated, international and commercial which 
will not fall under the categories of Article 1 (2) and (3) of the Convention. The exclusion of 
Article 1 (2) exists so as to understand that the Convention refers to commercial disputes and 
not to consumer disputes which would cause conflict with the domestic public policies of each 
contracting party.35 Thus, it is clear from the very beginning of the Convention that it is 
interested in international trade. Additionally, exclusion stated in Article 1 (3) targets two 
kinds of IMSAs: arbitral awards which cannot be enforced under the New York Convention36 
and judicial settlements under the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court 
Agreements37 which are incapable of enforcement. For instance, a settlement agreement 
which takes place outside of the court and is not brought back to a state court for judicial 
approval is not possible to be enforced under the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 since it 
is not considered a judicial settlement.38 Another example on the same issue refers to the 
                                                          
32 Graziadei M., Recognition of Common Law Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions under the Hague Trusts Convention 
with particular regard to the Italian experience, in. Smith L.  Re-imagining the Trust Trusts in Civil Law, Cambridge 
University press, 2012, p. 45 
33 ibid 15 p. 41 
34 Čerka P., Grigienė J. & Sirbikytė G., ‘Is it possible to grant legal personality to artificial intelligence software 
systems?’ 2017, Computer Law & Security Review 33, p. 696 
35 Shouyu C. & Steffek F., ‘Enforcement of International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation under 
the Singapore Convention – Private International Law Issues in Perspective’, 2019 Singapore Academy of Law 
Journal 31, p. 457 
36 Born G., International Commercial Arbitration, 2014, pp. 3021-3027 
37 Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, Article 12 
38 Ibid 35 p. 460 
cases that cannot be enforced due to a certain limitation period of enforcement.39 As a result, 
the Singapore Convention aims to cover all the IMSAs that do not fall within the scopes of the 
international instruments mentioned above.  
No ‘seat’ of mediation 
 
A similar strategy of the Singapore Convention can be illustrated from the fact that the 
necessity of the ‘seat’ of mediation. Such element demonstrates the absolute dimension of 
Singapore Convention in cross-border disputes. Cross-border mediation is now even more 
topical since the last years has been developed significantly within the European Union. For 
instance, there are mechanisms that are able to identify strengths and weaknesses of 
mediation of each European regulatory regime, such as the Regulatory Robustness Ratings.40 
This also comes in contrast with the New York Convention and follows the practice of 
mediation where in none cases the issue of ‘seat’ was ever addressed. However, in New York 
Convention, Article 1 states that it “shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards made in the territory of a State [i.e. the ‘seat’] other than the State where the 
recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought”.41 It refers to an international 
foreign award to be enforced and it is clear that the enforcement process of the Singapore 
Convention is fundamentally different in the sense that it is more flexible. In Article 1 (1) of 
the Singapore Convention it states that the settlement agreement needs to be international.42 
In practice, this means that there is direct enforcement of an IMSA directly to the courts of 
the State where the assets are located and thus enforced in the same State. Following the 
New York Convention, it is different because after an arbitral award is issued it can only then 
be enforced and not necessarily in the same State the award was issued but more likely to a 
different jurisdiction, depending on the agreement. In other words, New York Convention is 
adjusted to the ‘localisation theory’ while the Singapore Convention approaches the 
                                                          
39 Schnabel T., ‘The Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Framework for the Cross-Border Recognition and 
Enforcement of Mediated Settlements’, 2019, Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 19(1) p. 26 
40 Alexander N., Introducing Regulatory Robustness Ratings for Mediation Regimes in the EU, 2017, in Alexander 
N., Walsh S., and Svatos M., The EU Mediation Legal Handbook: Regulatory Robustness for Mediation Regimes, 
Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2017, p. 42 
41 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, The New York Convention 1958 
(NYC), Article 1 
42 Ibid 1 Article 1 
‘decocalisation theory’.43 Both theories are significant depending on the context. Localisation 
theory is important in arbitration since it is interconnected with the fact where the courts of 
arbitration are seated they are able to scrutinise international arbitral awards and decide if 
they can be set aside or not. Another example the importance of distinguishing a domestic 
award with a foreign one.  On the other hand, within the context of mediation “The 
‘delocalisation theory’ envisions a dissociation of mediation from the laws of the geographical 
location where mediation takes place. This approach puts a premium on party autonomy and 
the ability of parties to self-regulate by the laws and rules they have selected. The theory 
rejects the idea of any supervision by a putative ‘seat’ of mediation.”44. This is in practice could 
mean that IMSAs can be enforced by the courts of a State which has ratified the Singapore 
Convention and thus the party seeking enforcement can save costs and time to claim the 
subject matter of the settlement agreement.  
The Singapore Convention hopefully for all the signatories will be a revolutionary legal 
instrument in relation to the development of mediation in international trade. For this reason, 
the Working Group II drafted the Singapore Convention broadly in some necessary parts such 
as the definitions of “mediation” and “settlement agreements”. At the same time, it drafted 
in a precise and coherent manger the enforcement of an IMSA. Article 4 (1) of the Singapore 
Convention sets the requirements for reliance on settlement agreements. The party who is 
seeking to enforce an IMSA is solely required to present to the competent authority a) the 
written IMSA and b) to present evidence that the written IMSA was procured as a result of a 
mediation process. It is clear that generally the necessary requirements are as minimal as 
possible. Additionally, Article 2 (2) has foreseen the possibility that the “in writing” 
requirement for the settlement may cover situations “if its content is recorded in any form. 
The requirement that a settlement agreement be in writing is met by an electronic 
communication if the information contained therein is accessible so as to be usable for 
subsequent reference”. As a result, it includes possibilities where online dispute resolutions 
take place through online platforms. Mediation is a process which is flexible in itself and thus, 
such a vision in the Singapore Convention could not be omitted. In any case, it can be said as 
rather insightful at this moment. Online alternative dispute methods are developing rather 
                                                          
43 Shouyu C., Alexander N., ‘Singapore Convention Series: Why Is There No Seat of Arbitration?’, Kluwer 
Arbitration Blog, 2019 
44 Ibid 43 
quickly the last years and it seems that due to the conditions today, unavoidably they will 
evolve even more forceful. For instance, since the last years Singapore Employment Claims 
Tribunal has available e-negotiation and e-mediation services45. Even though claims which fall 
under the employment law do not fall under the scope of application of Singapore 
Convention, the tools that have developed such electronic platforms might be usable in the 
future to create platforms that can resolve certain types of cross-border commercial 
disputes.46 In conclusion, the Singapore Convention is drafted in a manner which will be as 
functional in cross-border disputes which are face to face but also presence will not be a 
mandatory requirement. 
This first chapter aimed to equip the reader with the necessary information about what 
constitutes mediation and how mediation is settled within the Singapore Convention. 
Providing the background of the Singapore Convention assisted in comprehending the 
rationale of the final text, while certain clarifications with regard to the definition of 
mediation, the scope of application and the seat mediation were of the essence. The 
dissertation will now proceed in exploring certain particularities of the Singapore Convention 
and specifically Article 5 and its role while its application will be fundamental as to whether 
encourage parties to rely on Singapore Convention. Parties relying on the Singapore 
Convention should have the notion that where they seek relief justifiably, the relief will be 







                                                          
45 Seow J., ‘New Employment Claims Tribunals portal allows users to have disputes mediated online, The 
StraitsTimes’, 4 January 20119, The Straits Time 
46 Ibid 15 p. 43 
Reflections on Article 5 of the Singapore Convention 
This chapter examines the nature of Article 5 of the Singapore Convention in order to examine 
the method of application by the courts in the near future and the obstacles that could arise 
from the interpretation it could receive. The reader is first provided with the exact provision, 
so as to be able to develop their own critical analysis concurrently with the analysis provided 
by the present author. 
Provisions of Article 5, Grounds for refusing to grant relief 
Perhaps the most debatable Article in the Singapore Convention is Article 5. There was a lot 
of debate as to its draft in order to provide clarity for the signatories and also would not be a 
deterrent factor in the reasonable enforceability of an IMSA. Article 5 sets out the ground for 
refusing to grant relief and the majority of the grounds must be raised and proved by the 
party who seeks relief. Specifically, Article 5 (1) states:  
“The competent authority of the Party to the Convention where relief is sought under article 4 
may refuse to grant relief at the request of the party against whom the relief is sought only if 
that party furnishes to the competent authority proof that:  
a) A party to the settlement agreement was under some incapacity;  
b) The settlement agreement sought to be relied upon: i) Is null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed under the law to which the parties have validly subjected it or, 
failing any indication thereon, under the law deemed applicable by the competent authority 
of the Party to the Convention where relief is sought under article 4; ii)  Is not binding, or is not 
final, according to its terms; or iii) Has been subsequently modified;  
c) The obligations in the settlement agreement:  
i) Have been performed; or  
ii) Are not clear or comprehensible;  
d) Granting relief would be contrary to the terms of the settlement agreement;  
e) There was a serious breach by the mediator of standards applicable to the mediator or the 
mediation without which breach that party would not have entered into the settlement 
agreement; or  
f) There was failure by the mediator to disclose to the parties circumstances that raise 
justifiable doubts as to the mediator’s impartiality or independence and such failure to disclose 
had a material impact or undue influence on a party without which failure that party would 
not have entered into the settlement agreement.” 
Article 5 (2) states:  
The competent authority of the Party to the Convention where relief is sought under article 4 
may also refuse to grant relief if it finds that:  
a) Granting relief would be contrary to the public policy of that Party; or  
b) The subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by mediation under the law 
of that Party 
Article 5 (a) (b) (c) and (d) refers to contractual issues of the settlement agreement whereas 
(e) and (f) points out a fundamental breach by the mediator and an omission to disclose 
related to his impartiality or independence. Lastly, paragraph 2 of Article 5 refers to public 
policy reasons of non-enforcement and where the subject matter is not capable of settlement 
by mediation i.e. there cannot be an IMSA at the first place. In any case, it must be pointed 
out that the list of the grounds for refusing to grant relief is exhaustive, certainly limited but 
provided in general terms. The reason for this is not to cause any distress to the enforcing 
authority and at the same time give flexibility regarding the interpretation of the Article.47 
May Refuse to Grant Relief  
Initially, it is of great importance to note the choice of words in Article 5 (1). Specifically, a 
relevant authority “may refuse to grant relief”. This approach is similar to the wording of 
Article V (1) of the New York Convention 1958 where it states that “Recognition and 
enforcement of the award may be refused”. It is the same approach though which raise d a 
lot of debate and how the courts should interpret and apply this Article, as the discretion of a 
court has raised a lot of debates. For instance, it can lead to an absurd result where the court, 
taking into account all the circumstances, enforces the award under the New York 
Convention, despite the fact that an award-debtor managed to establish a ground for non-
enforcement. In other circumstances, the court decides the enforcement on the grounds of 
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whether is a significant case in from of the court or not, and thus relies on either low evidence 
or demands more in order to non-enforce an award. Such practices are not supported by 
international practice48 and the approach within the Singapore Convention remains to be 
seen how it will operate. However, it must be noted that there is a major difference which 
should affect in a positive manner this issue, and this is the lack of the requirement of the 
“seat”, and thus circumvents a conflict where courts under the New York Convention have to 
deal with rather often. Moreover, the issue of discretion was discussed by the Working Group 
II in relation to Article 1 (e), as it should be drafted as such. It was stated that it would be a 
positive addition since it would be usable to the interest of States that might be obliged under 
certain Treaties to recognise decisions of foreign courts. Emphasis was given that, in the end, 
it is all about the decision of the enforcing authority in the enforcement process49.  
The Element of Incapacity 
The specific ground is straightforward while it refers to the situations where one of the parties 
involved are minors, individuals with mental incompetency or legal persons not validly 
represented. However, the main concern is on which ground will be refused to grant relief i.e. 
which will be the applicable law in order to determine the incapacity of the party involved, 
since each law has a different view of who constitutes a minor. Two approaches have been 
discussed so far in this respect, one is the “validation principle” and the other is based on the 
doctrine of renvoi. Briefly, the “validation principle” states that the applicable law would be 
the one that the outcome will be reached50, while where the doctrine of renvoi will be applied, 
the State will issue renvoi (i.e. send back the case) to the State where the IMSA was concluded 
so as to ensure that the party in question indeed had the capacity at that time. However, 
international judicial practice is not fond of any of the above theories, since, for instance, 
“validation principle” has been troubling since recently some courts in international 
arbitration cases51. Regarding the renvoi doctrine, there are occasions where it will rise even 
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more confusion and complexity rather than certainty.52 As a result, it remains to be seen in 
practice how the courts will handle the issue of incapacity, although it can be argued that such 
circumstances will be minimum since parties will act in collaboration with their lawyers.  
Null and Void, Inoperative of Incapable Settlement Agreement  
The draft of this subparagraph aims to cover all possible results which may occur before, 
during or after a settlement agreement and is similar to the reasoning of Article II (3) of the 
New York Convention53. Specifically, as Alexander N. and Shouyu C. clarify, “null and void” 
refers to IMSAs which are ab initio. “Inoperative” refers to settlement agreements which form 
an IMSA but cannot be effective due to arising circumstances at the point of the formation or 
after it. Last but not least, settlement agreements which are “incapable of being performed” 
are due to independent circumstances or events which occur after the point of the formation 
of an IMSA and accordingly, has affected that existing situation to that point where it is not 
possible for the IMSA to be performed.54 Such examples involve contractual impossibility, 
frustration etc..55 A discussion took place during the Working Group II in relation to the word 
“void” which would merely cover situations of fraud, mistake, misrepresentation, duress and 
deceit and thus the words “voidable, or legally voided” should be added.56 However, it was 
commonly accepted that the initial phrasing (“void”) was broad to cover all the relevant 
contract related situations57. The essential element on this ground for refusal is the last 
phrase of the subparagraph i.e. “[..] under the law deemed applicable by the competent 
authority of the Party to the Convention where relief is sought under article 4”. As it is clearly 
stated, the competent authority needs to identify the applicable law before deciding if the 
settlement agreement is null and void. International law rules apply where the parties have 
made a choice of law which is not valid under the law of the state where relief is sought.58 In 
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this sense, the Working Group II achieved a balance between the fundamental principle of 
party autonomy, mandatory international laws and public policy. It was also highlighted that 
Article V (1) (a) of the New York Convention59 “contained a similar provision and it would be 
preferable not to depart from such language”.60 The question which arises though in the 
specific subparagraph is pointed out with the word “inoperative”. While it is a legal term and 
despite it has been laid down in New York Convention, it does not have a certain definition in 
contract law.61 Besides, the difference of “inoperative” and “incapable of being performed” 
is on a very thin line. Accordingly, the courts have proceeded in a case by case analysis in such 
situations and thus the flexibility of these legal instruments are again illustrated. An 
interesting approach of this condition can be illustrated by the case Apple & Eve, LLC v. Yantai 
North Andre Juice62. In this case, briefly, the US Federal Court of New York decided that the 
defendant had waived his right to arbitrate and thus the parties continued with the court 
proceedings. As a result, arbitration clause was found to be inoperative.  
Not Binding or Not Final Settlement Agreement 
Although this seems to be a precise and explicitly stated ground for refuse to grant relief, 
Working Group II discussed it extensively. The main starting reason was that such a clause is 
unnecessary since if a settlement agreement is not binding or final according to its terms will 
be in any case dismissed by the court i.e. not enforced.63 For instance, if is not signed by both 
parties it cannot be said that it is final. The subparagraph was put in order to provide guidance 
for the court to look into the terms of the agreement only and not take into account any other 
factors or circumstances apart from the written clause64. It generally refers to IMSAs which 
state either expressly or impliedly that they will not be binding or final.65 The discussion was 
finally raised on the whole context of Article 5 (1) (b) and after the necessary clarifications, 
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the Working Group II drafted it in its final form, but did not preclude any future discussions 
on its basis.66 For instance, an interesting proposal aimed on the time of performance of 
obligation which stated that “Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the obligations 
sought to be enforced were not agreed to be performed by the time of enforcement”, aiming 
at the same time to avoid the legal terms of “final” and (or) “binding”. Working Group II did 
not disregard any of the proposals but on this point they mentioned that it would be absurd 
to define the abovementioned terms when they have already been interpreted in a variety of 
manners under various legal instrument, including the New York Convention.67 Working 
Group II focused to look into this subparagraph at its whole and aimed to find a balance 
between functionality and simplicity which remains to be seen practice. If a draft includes 
numerous prerequisites to be applied, it is most likely to be disregarded in the first place.  
Subsequent Modified Settlement Agreement 
Settlement agreements which form an IMSA but later are modified, cannot be relied upon by 
a party. The party who seeks relief is required to present the settlement agreements in its 
latest form, including all of its amendments, in order to be accepted by a court. This clause 
could be also classified as redundant but it is fair and just for the parties to be able to seek 
relief even after a settlement agreement has been modified. Timothy Schnabel demonstrates 
this position rather interestingly. Specifically, he states that in an extreme situation “perhaps 
a party could argue that modifications to a settlement agreement take it outside the scope of 
the Convention, but only if the situation was so attenuated that the original mediated 
settlement e.g. if, twenty years after a mediated settlement, the parties modify it to such an 
extent that the obligations are completely displaced, and the parties seem to have chosen to 
modify the settlement agreement rather than enter into a new agreement for tactical reasons 
such as ensuring, in bad faith, continued application of the Convention”68.  
Performed Obligations of the Settlement Agreement 
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This situation will logically rise on a very limited scale since it exists to provide certainty rather 
than any application. The aim is to clarify that double claims are not permitted. When an IMSA 
has been properly performed based on its terms, additional relief cannot be granted. Even if 
it is an obvious situation, it could be added that even one respective claim, could add not only 
further imposition on a court but also frustration to the general justice system. In other words, 
when there are parties who seek actual relief and one of the reasons to have agreed to apply 
the Singapore Convention is to enforce less timely, a court should be spend time and effort 
examining an enforcement of an IMSA which has been actually been performed. 
Unclear or Incomprehensible Obligations of the Settlement Agreement  
This ground for refusal to grant relief is also straightforward. This clause applies where the 
IMSA is unclear and the court cannot risk of enforcing it not being absolute as to the 
obligations described therein. The Working Group II examined another option stating instead 
“the settlement agreement is not capable of being enforced”.69 However, this would be too 
broad and perhaps could give more discretionary power to the court than the one intended 
on the context of unclear obligations.  
Relief Contrary to the Terms of the Settlement Agreement  
This clause is slightly similar to the clause of Article 6 of the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)70. During the Working Group II, it was 
highlighted that Article 6 of CISG resembles the principle of party autonomy, which is 
fundamental in respect of the enactment of the Singapore Convention, but also it gives the 
ability for the parties to opt-out of the Convention. In relation the party autonomy, it would 
be abnormal to grant relief to parties where they have agreed otherwise in an IMSA, or, in 
other words, to enforce a settlement agreement contrary to the terms of the settlement 
agreement.71 Besides, such an action would be against the purpose of mediation itself, since 
the key feature is the ability to reach a mutual agreement which is decided by the parties 
themselves. Accordingly, this clause gives also the ability to opt-out of the Singapore 
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Convention, since the parties may explicitly state that e.g. the settlement agreement will not 
be enforced under the Singapore Convention. As a result, if such a term was within an IMSA, 
the court would apply Article 5 (d). It was also discussed that this clause includes numerous 
circumstances, where the parties agree to seek relief under the Singapore Convention but 
there are obligations in the settlement agreement which precede or have not yet been 
fulfilled72. For instance, such inclusion attempts to prevent cases where a party may seek 
relief in bad faith, because the other party cannot yet fulfill his obligations due to force 
majeure.73 In this context, this clause comes to complete the conditions to refuse grant relief 
under Article 5 (1) (c) (i). The competent authority may refuse to grant relief where the 
obligations of the settlement agreement have been performed or not due to obligations 
stated within the settlement agreement which precede or have yet to be fulfilled before 
seeking relief.   
Breach of the Mediator directly linked with the Settlement Agreement 
This ground for refusal to grant relief has two elements which need to coincide. First, there 
must be a serious breach by the mediator and secondly, the breach would affect the 
settlement agreement so much that the parties would not have entered into it at the first 
place. The breach of the mediator must be atrocious and the clause specifies that this breach 
is measured according to the standards applicable to mediator. Those standards could be 
applied based on the regime the mediator obtained his license or based on the location of the 
mediation (if it is located at one specific place), or prior to an agreement between the parties 
and the mediator (e.g. according to the rules of an administering institution)74. For instance, 
relevant here is the Law Society’s Mediation Scheme which encompasses the Code of Conduct 
of mediators Singapore as guidance for the observance of the high ethical standards which 
are expected75 but also the Code of Professional Conduct of the International Mediation 
Institute76 which also provide guidance at an international level. The burden of proof is on the 
parties to prove the specific breach. Additionally, the parties must prove that this breach was 
the cause that the settlement agreement was concluded. There must a causal link between 
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the breach of the mediator and the final IMSA. In other words, it must be proved that had not 
been the breach by the mediator, the settlement agreement which would form an IMSA 
would be substantially different, if concluded. The Working Group II had to discuss different 
views before of the draft of this clause in its final form. To conclude that there must be a 
“serious breach” aims to objective criteria and alternative terms such as “gross misconduct”, 
“violate”, “material impact” and “undue influence” are not known in certain legal traditions 
and accordingly might cause uncertainty as to their applications.77 However, it will be seen in 
the next clause, that “material” and “undue influence” were used by the Working Group II  
finally, on a more specific context of this area. In any case, the key issue of this clause is not 
to prove the serious breach rather than proving the causal relationship between the serious 
and the outcome of the settlement agreement. If such a breach is not straightforward, it 
would be difficult for the parties to prove it, since the court must acknowledge the state of 
mind of the parties at that time. Another issue is whether the element of causation can be 
found or may be lost through the procedure. If, for instance, mediation procedure lasts for 
two years, the breach occurs the first month and the settlement agreement is concluded after 
two years, the evidence to bring out to prove the breach will make it a rather difficult task. 
On the other hand, the court who seeks to enforce an award, is on a thin line as to refuse 
grant relief to party who claims, on bad faith, misconduct of the mediator. It is most likely 
that the latter will occur, since mediation is based on mutual understanding of the parties 
who enter to such a procedure willing to conclude an agreement. Apart from this element, a 
party may withdraw from mediation at any time in contrast with other disputes settlement 
modes such as arbitration.  
 
Impartiality and Independence of Mediator and Failure to Disclose 
This ground for refusal is a specific circumstance of the ground for refusal mentioned above 
(Article 5 (1) (e)). Again, the parties need to demonstrate that the mediator’s conduct was 
inappropriate and specifically, he failed to disclose circumstances that raise justifiable doubts 
in relation to his impartiality or independence.  The term of “justifiable thoughts” was clarified 
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during the Working Group II. It was stated that once again the test which should be followed 
in order to define justifiable thoughts is based on objective criteria78. The same is established 
on the term of “material impact” and includes situations such as misrepresentation to the 
terms of an IMSA or an unconscionable misconduct by the mediatior. Accordingly, it covers 
situations where the parties were unaware of the misconduct of the mediator in contrast with 
clause (e) of the Article which states that there must be a serious breach. In other words, 
clause (e) describes an action of the mediator which vitiated the consent of the parties to 
conclude a settlement agreement whereas clause (f) covers the omission of the mediator to 
act according to the applicable code of conduct. Such an omission is directly related to his 
impartiality or independence and the parties need to establish causation between the failure 
to disclose and the IMSA. An interesting case was brought before the Singapore High Court 
regarding the issue of “undue influence” which needs to be illustrated. In the case of Chan 
Gek Yong v Violet Netto79, the claimant had concluded an IMSA with the defendant but after 
one week she changed her mind. She informed the High Court at a pre-trial conference that 
she wished to continue the legal proceedings which had been initiated prior to the conclusion 
of the IMSA. The Court stated that since she had validly concluded the IMSA with the 
defendant, it would be an abuse of process to proceed with court actions, since the matter at 
dispute had already been settled according the process of mediation. The claimant raised the 
fact that she signed under undue influence since because the mediators stated to accept the 
offer by the defendant since it was almost the end of the one-day mediation session and if 
not, they would have to go back to the Court to continue the trial. The Court found that there 
was no real pressure and thus, undue influence on the part of the mediators, even if the 
claimant perceived the situation as such. It was noted in this case that the claimant could take 
more time so as to be more confident and then sign the relevant settlement agreement and 
also that she was not represented by a lawyer on her own wish. It was held that a mere change 
of mind cannot constitute undue influence, especially after the conclusive IMSA. In order to 
avoid such cases in the future, and thus not challenge a settlement agreement since such 
actions underestimates the whole process outside of the courts, parties should take 
reasonable care before signing an IMSA and from the part of the mediators, statements to 
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the parties during the process must be carefully put so as they will not be misconstrued.80 The 
Singapore Courts also dealt with the issue of material impact of the misconduct of a mediator 
in relation to unconscionability. In the case of BOM v BOK81 the respondent was a husband 
who had signed a declaration of trust. He had lost his mother recently and was in a heavy 
state of grief. His wife, who used to practice the law, took advantage of the situation and 
along with her father persuaded him to sign a declaration of trust to sign away the total of his 
inheritance and put it on trust in favor of their infant child. However, the Court of Appeal in 
Singapore held that such a signing of the declaration of trust is unconscionable because his 
wife misrepresented to him that the trust would take effect after his death and threatened 
him that he will not live in their house anymore if he would not sign it. As a result, the Court 
applied the doctrine of unconscionability under a reformulated test82 and concluded that a 
case by case factual analysis is significant on such situations. In conclusion, it is possible to say 
that Article 5 (f) and (e) conjunctively demonstrate the significance of the duty of the mediator 
to follow the applicable code of conduct and must not act on his own will out of this context.  
Relief contrary to Public Policy 
Article 5 (2) states two grounds where a competent authority may refuse to grant relief i.e. 
due to public policy reasons and because the subject matter is not capable of settlement by 
mediation. This Article is similar to the provision of the New York Convention. Thus, it is 
inferred that the burden of proof is still on the party resisting the relief, apart from the fact 
that court can raise this issue willingly83. From the wording of this clause, the competent 
authority may refuse to enforce an IMSA which is contrary to the public policy of that party 
i.e. of the State where the enforcement is sought84. However, public policies issues vary from 
State to State and thus, they must be used with caution so as not to encourage parties to raise 
such a ground for refusal. In the context of the prevailing private international law rules 
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policies of both domestic and international principles must be taken into account85. 
Consequently, the competent authority should only under “highly exceptional circumstances” 
refuse to enforce an IMSA under Article 5 (2) (a).86 Additionally, the Working Group II clarified 
that “it would be up to each Contracting State to determine what constituted public policy. In 
that context, it was agreed that public policy could include, in certain cases, issues relating to 
national security or national interest.”87. An approach of this clause can be illustrated in the 
case of Daiichi Sankyo Company v Malvinder88. In this case, the High Court of New Delhi 
refused to enforce an international arbitral award which bound two children (8 and 12 years 
old) to compensate an enormous amount of losses, more than 460 million euros. Such an 
amount of compensation for the two young children was contrary to both domestic and 
international public policies. Lastly, it is important also to note the statements of Gross J in 
the case of IPCO Nigeria Ltd v Nigerian National Petroleum Corp89 where he noted that 
“considerations of public policy, if relied upon to resist enforcement of an [arbitral] award, 
should be approached with extreme caution .. [the public policy exception] was not intended 
to furnish an open-ended escape route for refusing enforcement of New York Convention 
awards”. The same approach is expected to be followed on the application of the Singapore 
Convention, and if so, the results will be satisfactory and positive since Gross J summed up 
the issue of public policy in the most precise manner while also tersely. 
The subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by mediation  
Under this provision, the competent authority may refuse to enforce an IMSA “if the subject 
matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by mediation under the law of that Party” 
(i.e. the law of the State seeking enforcement). The crucial issue of the choice of law is left to 
the competent authority. However, this ground should be also be used cautiously and in 
limited conditions in order to be used as an “escape route” as is mentioned above. In other 
words, the approach should be similar with the public policy issue addressed above. Here, the 
party needs to establish that the subject matter of the dispute cannot proceed to the 
procedure of mediation and therefore the Singapore Convention cannot be applied. For 
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instance, the South Korean Law excludes some intellectual property disputes being able to 
settle through mediation90. Specifically, the validity of patent rights is not an issue to be 
administered by any civil courts or tribunals91. In practice, the specific ground for refusal is 
presumed to be quite rare as an arising condition, even less often in contrast with arbitration, 
“since states are less likely to restrict the voluntary settlement of disputes than to prevent 
them from being resolved by arbitration), and in any event would only affect whether a 
mediated settlement can be relied upon in a certain jurisdiction”92. An interesting example 
was provided by Born, who supports the view that in the context of international commercial 
arbitration courts need to avoid being narrow in scope when they face the issue of the 
subject-matter in question to be capable of settlement by mediation93. The example he 
brought up includes a hypothetical scenario where “under the laws of Country X, commercial 
tax disputes are subject matters incapable of settlement at mediation. The forum of Country 
X is presented with an international mediated settlement agreement that was concluded in 
Country Y, of which the choice of law for that settlement points to the laws of Country Z (noting 
that under the rules of Y and Z tax disputes are susceptible to mediation). If the mediated 
dispute has no substantive connection to Country X, the courts of Country X should not refuse 
relief and follow their convention obligations to enforce dispute resolution outcomes”94.  
 
 
Article 6: Parallel Applications or Claims 
Article 6 of the Singapore Convention states that “If an application or a claim relating to a 
settlement agreement has been made to a court, an arbitral tribunal or any other competent 
authority which may affect the relief being sought under article 4, the competent authority of 
the Party to the Convention where such relief is sought may, if it considers it proper, adjourn 
the decision and may also, on the request of a party, order the other party to give suitable 
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security.” This Article is similar to the respective Article of the New York Convention (Article 
VI)95. However, in respect of Article 6 of the Singapore Convention there has been a debate 
and several discussions as to its practical effectiveness and whether practically is actually 
similar to Article VI of the New York Convention. Article 6 of the Singapore Convention refers 
to a situation where the competent authority of a signatory State may refuse to enforce an 
IMSA which is challenged in another signatory State. However, in contrast with the relevant 
Article of the New York Convention, Article VI refers to Article V (1) (e) which states that “the 
award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a 
competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was 
made”96. The Singapore Convention does not provide for such a ground for refusal to grant 
relief and thus the question which is raised is whether Article 6 provides an implied ground 
for refusal to grant relief or the provision is limited to be applied providing the authority 
where relief is sought with a right to adjourn its decision97. It has been argued that “an implied 
ground for refusal of enforcement could be read into Article 6 of the Singapore Convention. 
This may be buttressed upon trite private international law principles of recognition of foreign 
judgments (i.e., particularly of a court judgment that determines finally and conclusively if an 
IMSA may be refused enforcement in that jurisdiction).”98.  In any case, the Working Group II 
intended that the application of Article 6 would be similar to the Article VI of the New York 
Convention, and probably this is why a suggestion to delete  the phrase “if it considers proper” 
was not supported since this is the necessary discretion which is needed in order for Article 6 
to be applied effectively.99 The spirit of the Singapore Convention is to be applied in good 
faith and thus, each signatory state must recognise another’s court judgement as to whether 
an IMSA may be refused to be enforced or not. 
Conclusions 
                                                          
95 Article VI of the NYC states that: If an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has been 
made to a competent authority referred to in article V (1) (e), the authority before which the award is sought to 
be relied upon may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the award and may 
also, on the application of the party claiming enforcement of the award, order the other party to give suitable 
security. 
96 Article V (1) (e) of the NYC 
97 Ibid 35 p. 477 
98 Shouyu C. & Alexander N., ‘An implied Ground for Refusal to Enforce IMSAs under the Singapore Convention 
on Mediation: The Effect of Article 6’, 2019 Kluwer Mediation Blog 
99 Ibid 18 p. 12 
This paper aimed to point out specific elements of the groundbreaking Singapore Convention. 
Since it is such a recent Convention, it will produce a lot of discussions in the future in relation 
to different sectors each time. To that end, initially, a definition of mediation under the 
Singapore Convention was provided. One of the main reasons the Singapore Convention is 
such as a bold step towards equalizing mediation and arbitration is the element of 
enforceability. In order to have a picture of the distinction in preferring arbitration to 
mediation, a few useful statistics were subsequently provided. Before delving into the content 
of the Singapore Convention, some background information was given to comprehend the 
legal rationale underlying it. The dissertation, then, pursued to offer a simple, yet essential 
overview of the basic provisions of the Singapore Convention so as to see the overall 
application of it.  Having obtained the necessary foundations to proceed to deeper analysis, 
the dissertation then proceeds to examine particularities found within it, and specifically 
Article 5, which has been, justifiably, the most debatable Article of the Singapore Convention. 
Only time will time, whether this Articles imposes indeed a hindrance to the promotion of 
mediation or not. At this early stage, only speculations could take place 
Article 5: Refusal to grant relief since this Article will be the key point for the effectiveness of 
the Singapore Convention between the signatory states. The Working Group II intended to 
clarify all of the possible matters which may be considered by the courts in the future and 
indeed it was successful. The Reports of the Working Group II cover almost every possible 
situation which need examination in relation the Singapore Convention. However, there are 
practical issues which may arise in the future which cannot be predicted. The focus of the 
analysis of Article 5 is to consider all possible scenarios which may affect the effectiveness of 
the Singapore Convention. For instance, the objective of the Working Group II was to set an 
exhaustive list of the grounds which a competent authority may refuse to grant relief. 
However, as it was explained above, Article 6 is also another justification to refuse grant relief 
applying private international law principles. In any case, the aim is to acknowledge an 
international mediated settlement agreement as an enforceable legal instrument worldwide. 
It is a result of the impact of the international trade in relation to the tendency for the parties 
to enter into mediation the last years, as demonstrated by the recent statistics in this paper. 
As the New York Convention was a landmark Convention and legally enforced foreign arbitral 
awards, it is most likely that the Singapore Convention will achieve the same results through 
the years and overcome any possible discrepancies. For instance, Article 8 of the Singapore 
Convention also provides flexibility for a state to opt-out from the Convention100. On this 
context, as Chong and Steffek noted, there are two issues a potential signatory state is 
considering joining the Singapore Convention101. Regarding the reservations, is it inferred that 
the Convention applies even though the parties have not explicitly stated that during their 
agreement? As Chua observed, “although it may be said that permitting such a declaration 
would water down the effectiveness of the Singapore Convention, this was a necessary 
compromise for the Working Group to progress in the negotiations. One can always hope that 
even if such a declaration is made from an abundance of caution, it may later be removed 
once a State becomes more confident of the usefulness of the enforcement procedure for 
international mediation settlement agreements. At least the default position is for the 
Singapore Convention to apply regardless of any express indication by the parties of their 
agreement to it, suggesting that most of the members of the Working Group do not foresee 
that such a declaration would be made”102. The second issue which arises is in relation to 
Article 3 of the Singapore Convention (General Principles)103. Since the Convention offers the 
general principles which need to apply, the question is whether the rules and procedures of 
the party are functional in order to enforce an international settlement agreement. The key 
                                                          
100 Article 8 of the Singapore Convention states that: 1. A Party to the Convention may declare that: (a)It shall 
not apply this Convention to settlement agreements to which it is a party, or to which any governmental agencies 
or any person acting on behalf of a governmental agency is a party, to the extent specified in the declaration; 
(b)It shall apply this Convention only to the extent that the parties to the settlement agreement have agreed to 
the application of the Convention. 2. No reservations are permitted except those expressly authorized in this 
article.3. Reservations may be made by a Party to the Convention at any time. Reservations made at the time of 
signature shall be subject to confirmation upon ratification, acceptance or approval. Such reservations shall take 
effect simultaneously with the entry into force of this Convention in respect of the Party to the Convention 
concerned. Reservations made at the time of ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention or accession 
thereto, or at the time of making a declaration under article 13 shall take effect simultaneously with the entry 
into force of this Convention in respect of the Party to the Convention concerned. Reservations deposited after 
the entry into force of the Convention for that Party to the Convention shall take effect six months after the date 
of the deposit. 4. Reservations and their confirmations shall be deposited with the depositary. 5. Any Party to 
the Convention that makes a reservation under this Convention may withdraw it at any time. Such withdrawals 
are to be deposited with the depositary, and shall take effect six months after deposit. 
101 Ibid 35, p. 485 
102 Chua E., ‘The Singapore Convention on Mediation — A Brighter Future for Asian Dispute Resolution’, 2019 
Asian Journal of International Law 9(2) 
103 Article 3 of the Singapore Convention states that: 1. Each Party to the Convention shall enforce a settlement 
agreement in accordance with its rules of procedure and under the conditions laid down in this Convention.2. If 
a dispute arises concerning a matter that a party claims was already resolved by a settlement agreement, a Party 
to the Convention shall allow the party to invoke the settlement agreement in accordance with its rules of 
procedure and under the conditions laid down in this Convention, in order to prove that the matter has already 
been resolved. 
for such a result is the need of signing by more states which they will choose to join the 
Convention. Being in in this privileged group which the Convention offers, will only have 
benefits since there was no legal instrument which enforced cross-border mediated 
settlement agreements. Mediation in its nature is a procedure which focuses to a win-win 
situation for both parties. Apart from its nature, it is less costly and less timely for the parties 
to achieve an alternative dispute resolution. The willingness of the states to resolve their 
disputes should be seen as a phenomenon which overrides any issues which might arise 
applying the Singapore Convention. As there is mutual agreement from mediation, there 
should a mutual agreement by the states to apply the Singapore Convention in good faith so 
as to get the best possible results from it. Besides, it is explicitly stated in the Preamble “that 
the establishment of a framework for international settlement agreements resulting from 
mediation that is acceptable to States with different legal, social and economic systems would 
contribute to the development of harmonious international economic relations.”104 
 
  
                                                          
104 Ibid 1, p. 3 
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